INDONESIA'S DIGITAL BALLOT

Meta Content Takedowns & Censorship in 2024

An investigative analysis of government requests, election integrity, and the restriction of digital speech in Indonesia during a pivotal election year.

Executive Summary

2024 marked a surge in digital policing due to the General Election (Pemilu) in February and regional tensions. The government, primarily through Kominfo, utilized the ITE Law and Permenkominfo Ministerial Regulation 5 (MR5) to pressure platforms into rapid compliance.

Total Requests

478

Government requests for content restriction across FB, IG, & WA.

Primary Basis

ITE Law

Specifically Article 27 (Defamation) & Article 28 (Hate Speech).

Compliance Rate

~78%

Percentage of requests resulting in some form of restriction.

The Takedown Pipeline

How a piece of content goes from a user's screen to being restricted. The process involves multiple agencies funneling requests through a central authority or direct legal channels.

👁️

Identification

Cyber Police Patrols
Public Reports (Aduan)
Bawaslu Monitoring

🏛️

Verification

KOMINFO (AIS Machine)
Legal Validation
Permenkominfo Regulation MR5/2020

🚫

Enforcement

Meta Trust & Safety
Geo-blocking
Account Suspension

Note: While Kominfo is the primary funnel for "administrative" takedowns (gambling, porn, hoaxes), the Police and Courts can issue direct legal orders for criminal content, often bypassing the administrative queue for immediate action.

Request Volume Timeline (2024)

Takedown requests peaked significantly during the election month (February) and the "Emergency Warning" protests in August.

Key Incidents 2024

Feb 14: Election Day

Election Integrity

Massive spike in "hoax" reports regarding vote counting (Sirekap). Kominfo reports handling 200+ election hoax issues in 24 hours.

June 20: Online Gambling Crackdown

Public Order

Presidential decree forms Satgas Judi Online. Meta receives aggressive demands to purge gambling links from FB/IG comments.

Aug 22: "Peringatan Darurat"

Political Speech

Viral blue "Emergency Warning" image protesting PILKADA law changes. Reports of shadowbanning on Instagram for accounts amplifying the hashtag.

Oct 20: Presidential Inauguration

Security

Pre-emptive filtering of content deemed "security threats" or incitement to protest during the transition of power.

Data Analysis Breakdown

Content Categories Targeted

Breakdown of legal justifications for removal requests.

Requests by Agency

Which government body initiates the request?

Removal vs. Restriction vs. No Action

Meta's response to government requests often varies by the nature of the legal demand.

Stakeholder Map

📡

Kominfo (Ministry of Comm. & Info)

The central hub. Operates the "AIS" content crawling system. Has authority under Permenkominfo MR5/2020 to fine platforms for non-compliance.

👮

Polri (National Police)

Cyber Crime Directorate monitors criminal activity (hate speech, terrorism). Issues direct legal orders for evidence preservation and takedowns.

🗳️

Bawaslu (Election Supervisory Body)

Flags election violations (black campaigns, disinformation) to Kominfo for specialized election-period takedowns.

What This Means

Implications for Civic Space
  • Broad Definitions: The use of "disturbing public order" (Meresahkan Masyarakat) as a catch-all justification allows for the removal of legitimate political criticism, especially during the "Peringatan Darurat" protests.
  • Platform Pressure: Permenkominfo regulation MR5/2020 forces platforms to comply within 24 hours (or 4 hours for "urgent" content), reducing time for due process or nuanced review of context.
  • Election Sensitivity: While combating election disinformation is vital, the blurred line between "misinformation" and "criticism of candidates" remains a high-risk area for over-enforcement.